The Red Baron's last flight


The Spring of 1918 was not very quiet on the Western Front. The Russian Armistice of 1917 had released most of the German divisions previously committed in the east and despite deprivations and food shortages at home their morale was reasonably high as they were re-deployed to the west. In contrast the Allied troops were war-weary and rapidly losing what little confidence they had left in their generals and political leaders, and, although America had declared war on Germany in 1917, her vast resources of materials and manpower had not yet been mobilised in strength. For these reasons, and others, the German High Command under Ludendorf had convinced itself that a window of opportunity existed to break the four year long stalemate of trench warfare and create a war of movement which they believed they could win.

On March 21st 1918 they launched a massive offensive against the Allied Forces in France and Belgium. It was in support of this action that on 12th April Manfred von Richthofen’s squadron, Jagdgeschwader NR 1, the Flying Circus, was deployed to a forward airfield on the Somme near the hamlet of Cappy. They were equipped mostly with Fokker D1 Triplanes but also had a few Albatross machines. The Triplanes were slightly dated by this time yet were still tough, manoeuvrable and possessed a climb rate that was more than a match for the faster Sopwith Camels that were their main combat adversaries. The squadrons primary role was to limit aerial observation of German troop concentrations whilst gaining similar intelligence regarding new artillery emplacements and troop regroupings as the Allies fell back under the onslaught.

April 21st dawned with thick mist along the Somme valley. Aircraft of neither side were able to get airborne until mid morning and even then the visibility was very patchy at low level. A Jasta (flight) of six Triplanes took off from Cappy at about 10.00 am to patrol the front. The pilots included Rittmeister Richthofen, Leutnant Hans Weiss, and a young man with a famous future, Herman Goering. At about the same time two Allied reconnaissance aircraft (RE8s) were taking off from the airfield at Poulainville about 4 kilometres north of Amiens. Pilot/observer crews were Lieutenants Simpson/Banks and Lieutenants Barrow/Garret, all Australians. Also at about this time a flight of five Camels was taking off from the airfield at Bertangles about 8 kilometres north of Amiens. At about 10.25 the RE8s were at 7000’ over Le Hamel photographing a heavy German troop concentration when they were intercepted by several Triplanes including a red one (Richthofen) and a blue/yellow one (Weiss). The RE8s turned for home in formation thereby preventing the attacking Triplanes from getting into 'killing' position by using the crossfire of their observer-operated machine guns as a rearguard. This was a proven defence in itself but any air duel between experts without surprise being a factor was rarely resolved rapidly and German pilots had learnt to respect the rearward fire power of a pair of RE8s. During the exchanges of fire Hans Wiess’s rudder was almost entirely shot off so he broke away and headed back to Cappy. Shortly after this the five Camels, led by Captain Roy Brown, joined the action and a typical WW1 'dogfight' ensued. Brown was a Canadian pilot who had learnt to fly as a civilian at his own expense in Edmonton and was now very experienced in front line air combat with eight confirmed 'kills' to his record. Other experienced pilots in the flight were Captain Oliver LeBoutillier (American) and Lieutenant Oliver Redgate (English) but one of the pilots was 2nd Lieutenant Wilfred 'Wop' May a new recruit from Canada on his first sortie over enemy lines.

Ritchthofen, perhaps identifying an inexperienced pilot, got on his tail briefly but for some reason did not fire. (The RE8 observers also commented afterwards that the red Triplane had not fired when seeming to be in an advantageous position. The fact is that jammed machine guns were an everyday problem for WW1 pilots. The usual cause was tolerance errors during the mass production of ammunition.) May, having had a lucky escape, pushed his Camel into a steep dive back towards his own lines. The Baron followed him down, presumably trying to manually clear his guns at the same time. He was after his 81st kill. Brown, who as flight leader would have felt responsible for the 'new boy', followed a few moments afterwards but now some distance behind. May pulled out of his dive just before tree top height about a kilometre south east of Sailly-le-Sec overhead Laurette and began zigzagging his Camel westwards over the Somme river and canal towards Voux-sur-Somme with the Triplane close behind. Zigzagging was not a good idea since it enabled the slower Triplane to cut the corners and remain in close pursuit. Zigzagging an aircraft also makes it aerodynamically less efficient because it 'skids'. The pair were now directly over the Allied lines and there were many reports from infantrymen of the red Triplane narrowly missing the Church tower at Vaux-sur-Somme (still there today) and also that it did not fire as frequently as they would have expected. (Some types of machine gun blockage could be cleared by the pilot manually ejecting the jammed bullet and then re-cocking the Maxim type mechanism.) Most of the eyewitnesses only mention two aircraft but a small number mention a third aircraft that made a fast attacking pass on the Triplane. It should be remembered that this was a new front line to which the Allies had retreated and it had not received concentrated fire from German artillery so there were still trees standing which would have obstructed the infantryman’s view from the ground. Brown would certainly have dived at close to his Camels VNE (180 mph) in an attempt to catch Richthofen but would have found it extremely difficult to co-ordinate his pull out into a favourable 'killing' position. The very best he could have hoped for was that a fast closing attack with guns firing constantly would get a lucky hit and at the worst it should be enough to spoil Richthofen’s enthusiasm for the chase. Brown's original claim, made immediately after his return to Bertangles, states that his attack was diagonally from the Triplanes rear left quarter. The best killing position is from behind at close range with matching speed. Whatever, according to many eye witnesses the Triplane continued the chase after Brown's attacking pass and it followed May's Camel up the rising wooded slope of Morlancourt Ridge towards the open ground near the Corbie to Bray road

Just before reaching the road the Triplane is reported to have abandoned the chase and entered a climbing turn to the right near the St Collette brick factory (still there today). By this time Richthofen’s aircraft was receiving some very unwelcome attention from riflemen and machine gunners in the Australian held positions below. (There is a puzzling fact about the chase. One of Richthofen’s strictest personal rules was not to fly at low level over enemy trenches and machine gun emplacements. He had written it in a Training Guide for new pilots. One explanation is that he was mistaken about his own position due to the patchy visibility at low level and his lack of airtime in this sector (his squadron had only been at Cappy for nine days). However the Allied front line was retreating so it should not be assumed that enemy positions were well known at all times during April 1918.) It is probably a reasonable guess that Richthofen suddenly became aware of his extremely vulnerable situation, hence the climbing right turn. Part way around the turn the Triplane was seen by numerous witnesses to pull up sharply, the engine was heard to cut, the nose dropped and shortly afterwards it made a very untidy landing in a field opposite the brick factory. After several bounces the undercarriage collapsed and the aircraft came to rest relatively intact against a pile of beet. What Manfred would not have known when he began his right turn was that in his lower 3 o’clock position was a camouflaged Vickers gun mounted on a special anti aircraft post and ball socket swivel joint that was being operated by Sergeant Cedric Basset Popkin, an Australian marksman and Machine Gunner First Class who had been trained in anti aircraft gunnery. When troops reached the Triplane very shortly after it came down they found Richthofen dead at the controls with a very large quantity of blood flowing from mouth and chest. The ignition and fuel cock were switched off. The propeller was undamaged and the cylinders of the Le Rhone rotary engine were also undamaged. Clearly the engine had not been rotating at the time the undercarriage collapsed. There was a bullet jammed in the breech of one gun. It was about 10.35 am. At post mortem (there were two of these) it was found that death was caused by a single bullet that entered just below the right armpit and exited, tumbling, on the left side at the level of the fifth rib. It would have caused massive internal damage and a powerful muscular spasm that would explain the Triplanes sharp pull up. Death would have followed within a very short time but it has been suggested by medical experts that after the initial shock a pilot might briefly recover sufficiently to go through the simple emergency landing drills; switches off, fuel off, etc whilst not actually believing the enormity of his wound.

Controversy over who had 'scored' this most prized of scalps began almost immediately. After all, Richthofen was a German folk hero by this time as well as being a menacing legend figure to the airmen who flew against him. There were four claims; observers Banks and Garret in the two RE8s made a joint claim (crossfire) which they later withdrew, Roy Brown made the second claim but the original document has quite clearly been altered, Private Vincent Emery who was firing a Lewis gun from the lower slopes of Morlancourt Ridge also made a claim and the fourth claim was made by Sergeant Popkin. Allied newspapers and propagandists had a field day and the morale of the Allied forces and civilians received a welcome boost. The latter was enhanced considerably by the fine story of how the mighty Red Baron was shot down by an RAF fighter pilot called Roy Brown and it was this story that came to be the popularly accepted one at the time.

Personally I think Sergeant Popkin deserved more of a mention but despite that we’ll never know whether an anonymous sharpshooter with a Lee Enfield rifle (and a talent for supplementing his army diet by popping off pigeons on the wing) saw the precise moment of his shot coincide with the Triplanes pull up. He’d 'know' but never be able to prove it.

HAGAR.

Sources: The Red Barons Last Flight, Franks and Bennett.

Battlefields of Northern France, Glover.

20th Century History - WW1, Equinox, and others.


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Last revised: 18 August 1998