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G W F Hegel (1770-1831)
Georg Hegel was a German "idealist" [1] philosopher who became one
of the most influential thinkers of the 19th century. At the same
time, there can be little doubt that he was one of the most
obtuse thinkers of his time - in Bertrand Russell's words "…the hardest to understand of all the great
philosophers".
His thought was adopted by many Protestant theologians
and, with unfortunate consequences for many million victims, one of his disciples was Karl Marx.
Born in Stuttgart in 1770, the son of a civil servant, Hegel
was brought up in an atmosphere of Protestant Pietism
and
became thoroughly acquainted with the Greek and Roman
classics from an early age.
Encouraged by his father to be ordained in the Lutheran Church, Hegel entered the seminary at the University of
Tübingen in 1788. He became a private tutor until his father
died in 1799. Hegel's future was temporarily assured by a financial legacy that was sufficient to
free him from tutoring for the time being.
Having exhausted the legacy, Hegel eventually became a
professor at the University of Berlin. He died in Berlin on
November 14, 1831, during a cholera epidemic.
Hegel’s aim was to set forth a philosophical system so
comprehensive that it would encompass the ideas of his
predecessors and create a conceptual framework in terms
of which both past and future could be understood
philosophically. Such an aim would require nothing short
of a full account of reality itself.
Thus, Hegel conceived the subject matter of his philosophy
to be reality as a whole. This reality, or the total developmental
process of "everything", he referred to as the "Absolute".
According to Hegel, the task of philosophy is to chart the
development of the Absolute.
This involves [1] making clear the internal rational structure
of the Absolute; [2] demonstrating how the Absolute shows
itself in nature and human history; and [3] showing the end
or purpose towards which the Absolute is directed. This emphasis was, quite
naturally, attractive to a number of Christian thinkers of the time,
hard-pressed as they were to make sense of a growing gap between traditional
theology and contemporary view of reality.
While Hegel's thinking does indeed encompass wide stretches
of human experience, his critics probably have a good point
when they say that his personal knowledge - of history and the
philosophy of history for example - was in many respects
woefully incomplete, resulting in highly dubious conclusions. But his style was
persuasive and his arguments strong, so his impact was nevertheless great.
Concerning the rational structure of the Absolute, and
following the ancient Greek philosopher Parmenides,
Hegel argued that "what is rational is real and what is real
is rational". If one steps back a little from this, it seems an
obviously circular statement and a dubious one at that. Another way of putting
it might be to say something like, "If we want to know what is real, then
we have to think our way through to any conclusions. It's no good making
assumptions and we shouldn't just pluck answers out of thin air."
The
prevailing Christian doctrine at the time (as it is today) was that there are
such things as final or absolute truths "out there" which have been
revealed by God to humanity. In this context, Hegel's assertion and his general
methodology can be seen as an assertion of the contemporary stress on reason and
the scientific method to work out knowledge about the world.
Hegel made a further claim that the Absolute must ultimately be regarded
as pure Mind (Geist in German) which is in the process of
self-development. Only Mind (i.e. rationality) is real. The so-called "facts"
of empirical knowledge are "irrational" as long as they stand
alone. They become "rational" only when they are perceived
as aspects of the whole - the complex whole which is the
"Absolute".
Idealism in
relation to Hegel is the proposition that mind
and "spiritual" values are fundamental in the world as a whole.
That is, nothing is real except as a whole, which is itself a
complex system. No true statement can be made about any
one part of the universe (the Absolute) except insofar as it has
a place in the whole.
In assigning a place to one part of the
whole, one automatically assigns a place to everything else, because
knowing the place of one part of the whole implies knowing the
place of all the other parts. That is, the only truth is the whole truth.
The logical method that governs this developmental process from the part to the whole is "dialectic"
(or "give and take"). This
dialectical method involves the
notion that progress is the result of the conflict of opposites
which, though false when standing alone, become more true
when they are part of the whole. Dialectic, therefore, is the critical
investigation of the process of change in which an entity merges with, and is
made complete by, its opposite.
It seems to me that Hegel was attempting to
counter the tendency of his time to break every whole into its constituent
parts. Only when all these parts are analysed, it was thought, is it possible to
understand the whole. A problem was that the analytical process was sometimes
not reversed and the components of the whole labelled "the
truth".
Traditionally, the dialectical dimension
of Hegel’s thought has been analysed in terms of three categories: thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. Although Hegel almost never
used these terms, they are helpful in understanding his concept
of the dialectic.
The thesis, then, might be that a concept is part of the structure
of the Absolute (therefore part of "truth"). Such a concept
contains within itself incompleteness that gives rise to opposition
(antithesis), an apparently conflicting concept which is needed if the whole is
to be restored. As a result
of the conflict a third concept or form of consciousness arises (synthesis), which overcomes the conflict by reconciling at a
higher level the truth contained in both the thesis and antithesis.
This synthesis in turn may become a new thesis that generates
another antithesis, giving rise to a new synthesis - and in such a
fashion the process of metaphysical or historical development
is continually generated. Hegel thought that our understanding of the Absolute itself
(that is to say, the sum total of reality) is continually developing
in this dialectical fashion towards an ultimate end or goal. One author puts it
like this:
... each time an event occurs in the material world (Hegel calls it a
"thesis"), spirit generates an opposed event (an
"antithesis"), which tries to correct it. The tension between these
two is then resolved by yet a third event (the "synthesis") , which
serves to blend elements of both, only to serve as the new thesis for yet
another sequence or opposition and resolution.
For Hegel, therefore, reality is understood as the Absolute
unfolding dialectically in a process of self-development. As
the Absolute undergoes this development, it manifests itself
both in nature and in human history. Nature is the Absolute
objectifying itself in material form.
Our finite minds and the human
history we generate are the process of the Absolute manifesting itself in
that which is most like itself, namely, mind or consciousness.
In The Phenomenology of Mind (1807) Hegel traced the
stages of this manifestation in its various forms from the
simplest consciousness of objects, through self-consciousness,
rational consciousness, and the various forms of ethical and
religious consciousness, to "absolute knowledge" - that form
of consciousness in which the subject recognizes itself as
fundamentally identical with the Absolute.
So, for example, the thesis might be that which is "pure
being" - which just is, without any qualities. But the antithesis
would be that anything pure has no qualities; and that which
has no qualities can't be described; therefore pure being is
in reality "not being". But when we put thesis and antithesis
together into synthesis, we find that the union of "being" and
"not-being" is "becoming". Therefore the "Absolute is
Becoming".
Thus the thesis and antithesis are not superseded but completed
by the synthesis. It's therefore possible to build thesis, antithesis
and synthesis in layers towards a final truth.
This often seems to me a stilted, mechanical way of drawing conclusions.
But it should be remembered that today's capacity to recognise the relativity of
all knowledge was derived in part initially from Hegel's dialectic.
The goal of the dialectical process can be most clearly understood
at the level of reason. As finite reason progresses in understanding,
the Absolute progresses towards full self-knowledge. Indeed,
the Absolute comes to know itself through the human mind’s
increased understanding of reality (the Absolute). Hegel
analysed this human progression in terms of three levels: art,
religion, and philosophy.
Art grasps the Absolute in material forms, interpreting the
rational through the sensible forms of beauty.
It is conceptually superseded by religion, which grasps the
Absolute by means of images and symbols. The highest
religion for Hegel is Christianity, for in
Christianity the truth
that the Absolute manifests itself in the finite is symbolically
reflected in the Incarnation of Jesus Christ.
Philosophy, however, is conceptually supreme, because it
grasps the Absolute in terms of the concepts that structure it.
Once this has been achieved, the Absolute has arrived at full
self-consciousness - in Hegel’s terms, at "Absolute Mind" -
and the cosmic drama reaches its end and goal. Only at this
point did Hegel identify the Absolute with God. "God is God,"
Hegel argued, "only in so far as he knows himself."
In the process of analysing the nature of the Absolute,
Hegel made significant contributions in a variety of
philosophical fields, including the philosophy of history, ethics, and political philosophy.
With respect to history,
his two key explanatory categories are reason and freedom.
As a rational process, history is the "progress of the
consciousness of freedom". That is, it is the progressive
realization on the part of the human spirit (or "finite mind")
that its own essential nature is freedom, and thereby the
realization of that freedom.
For Hegel, every historical civilization expresses a certain
underlying conception of the human mind through the
customs, ethical practices, and social and political institutions
it establishes. It is only once these practices and institutions
have been established and become familiar, that the people
of that civilization can go on to make this underlying conception
explicit through its art, religion, and philosophy.
However, by so making this underlying conception explicit, the people come to experience it as contradictory,
and as inadequate to its sense of what the human spirit really
is. As a result, people gradually lose their loyalty to the
established practices and institutions, and the civilization
begins to decay.
Eventually a figure appears who leads the way in overthrowing the old instruments and replacing them with a new set that
more adequately expresses the real nature of the human spirit
as free. Hegel calls such figures "world historical individuals"
and gives Alexander the Great, Julius Caesar, and Napoleon
as examples. One wonders what he would have made of Adolf Hitler or Josef
Stalin.
The whole historical process of the rise and fall of civilizations
is thus a process through which the human spirit gradually
comes to self-knowledge and freedom. Hegel assigns the highest role in the historical process to the
Germans. "The German mind is the mind of the new world.
Its aim is the realisation of absolute truth …" His argument
is quite plainly without foundation, especially with hindsight.
He offers no explanation
or evidence why later history should embody categories
"higher" or "better" than any earlier categories - unless,
in
Bertrand Russell's words, "… one were to adopt the
blasphemous supposition that the universe was gradually
learning Hegel's philosophy".
Russell's comment, I think, puts a finger on an important weakness of
Hegel's thought. It is that any philosophical system can be created from a
priori axioms - statements which make internal sense when carried through
properly to completion.
But that doesn't guarantee that the entire philosophical system itself
has any relationship to the physical world.
An analogy might be the elaborate
psychological schema invented by Sigmund Freud. His system depended
almost entirely upon the concept of the Ego. But it has proved impossible
to demonstrate that any human behaviours are the result of either a
"thing" in human brains which might be called the Ego, or even
how the bio-chemical human system might be linked with human behaviour.
The concept of the State which Hegel developed is plainly
what was later to be known as fascist - that is, the doctrine
that the State exists for itself, not for the individual. Hegel
justified tyranny and war as means of preserving "… the
moral health of peoples".
This idea proved to be an exceedingly poisonous
plant in the fertile soil of European upheavals of the late 19th and early 20th
centuries.
Hegel saw the ethical practices and the social and political
institutions of modern society (such as the nuclear family
and the market economy) and of the modern state (for
example, an impartial system of law, a system of representation,
and a constitutional monarch) as effectively the final stage
in the evolution of social and political institutions. It's tragic that Hegel
did not have available the insights of psychology. If he had, he might have
placed the individual rather than the State at the centre of his social system.
In supposing that humanity was discovering itself in the Absolute, Hegel was in harmony with other European thinkers who supposed
that the human race was in a process of becoming better -
a supposition to be rudely destroyed by the excesses of the
First World War.
In Europe, in the wake of the French Revolution, it appeared
to some that the "end of history" had been reached.
Accordingly, Hegel thought of these social and political
institutions as fully expressing the freedom that is the defining character of the human mind. In The Philosophy of Right (1821)
he attempted to show how these institutions embodied freedom
in all its aspects, and so to justify them.
In particular, he tried to show how they unite two different kinds
of ethical outlook, which he called "morality" and "ethical
life".
At the level of morality, right and wrong are matters of individual
reason and individual conscience. At the level of ethical life, duty
is a matter of allegiance to the social wholes of which one is a member - one’s family, one’s social class or "estate", and one’s
country. Since individuals are only complete through their social
relationships within the whole, morality alone is inadequate and
one must move beyond it to the level of ethical life.
Thus the State is the expression of the most inclusive social whole
to which one can belong - one’s own country - so when there
is a conflict of duties, one’s duties to the State override all others.
Obedience to the general will, which is manifested in a properly
constituted state, is the proper act of a fully free and rational
individual.
Hegel could not perhaps have foreseen the terrifying social
expression of his approach in the militaristic doctrines of the political movements
which arose in Europe some decades later. The German fascist Adolf Eichmann
perhaps epitomised the idea that it is moral to commit even genocide if ordered
to by a duly constituted authority.
In terms of the human reasoning process, if all phenomena can't be "true" until they are perceived as part
of the whole, then Hegel must say how he knows this. For he
can't know any truth, not even this, unless he first knows the
entire whole - in this case the physical universe. But Hegel can't know the entire universe. This
difficulty is enough to indicate that a truly fundamental mistake
lurks somewhere in his thinking.
Hegel's assertions about the Absolute clearly land us in absurdities We end
up in a situation in which not only can't we know
anything, but in which language itself - the only vehicle we
have to express knowledge - becomes meaningless.
For example, the word "truth" means, according to Hegel, "all truth"
or
the "whole truth". But this is a circular proposition, since the
word "truth" is included in the defining phrase "all truth".
In this way, language ceases to be a way of expressing truth
since we need to know the entire meaning of all words in
order to know the meaning of only one.
Hegel's error was indeed fundamental, and his impressive
philosophical edifice accordingly impressively wrong as is
demonstrated, with hindsight, by the almost absurd errors
he made in relating his philosophy to real life and in particular to
corporate life embodied in the modern nation-state..
The fundamental error was therefore that if what is known
about one thing is so complete that it can be absolutely
marked off from all others, then all its properties are known -
a conclusion which Hegel himself fails to demonstrate in relation
to anything.
However watertight this argument may seem, it is
plainly impossible to know everything about even a few things,
never mind about everything. Hegel's poor logic can't be
excused by the interesting consequences to which it gives rise.
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[1] Idealism - To understand this term,
it's helpful to very
briefly consider some associated terms:
Naturalism - The proposition that what we call "mind"
or "spirit" are intangible phenomena which nevertheless
ultimately emerge from, and are reducible to, material
things or processes.
Realism - The conclusion that material things exist
independently of our perception. When we cease to
perceive something, it does not cease to exist (though
what is perceived is not necessarily uniform for
all perceivers).
Metaphysical idealism - Idealism which is not realist.
Objective idealism - Realism which is not naturalist.
Theism - In this context, the idealist perception that
God is a perfect, uncreated spirit or mind.
Pantheism - Nothing exists except God (Absolute
Being) and his modes or attributes. Therefore the material
world is an aspect of God the Spirit.
See also Idealism.
[2] Eight Theories of Religion, Daniel L Pals, OUP,
2006
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