Thought Map - History
(Continued)
The "head in the sand" movement
Well-known in this category are those who either ignore the methods of
contemporary history, or reserve the methods of history for only part of
their lives.
The former are pejoratively called
"fundamentalist." I won't here pay much attention to them,
except to say that their position is logically incompatible with all
contemporary knowledge. As Van A Harvey writes [2],
the historical method cannot in itself
be reconciled with the type of thinking which produces
traditional Christianity. To say both that the Bible is beyond historical
investigation and that you believe that Jesus existed as a matter
of history is a self-defeating argument.
Those who do try to sustain the latter approach seem to be able to deny the validity of historical
research when it comes to religion, but allow it when reading about, for
example, the Second World War. They appear able to hold within their
cognitive frameworks what seem to me to be two completely incompatible
ways of perceiving the world.
Of more immediate interest, however, are reactions to methods used very
recently by the Jesus Seminar of the Westar Institute
to arrive at what they hope is an irreducible residue of historical New Testament material.
This is material which by their account would
probably be recognised as good history even by secular historians.
Their findings have been dismissed by a large swathe of Christian
opinion as laughable. The main ground for this verdict appears to be
that the 200 or so scholars of the Jesus Seminar
"voted" on what material should be retained and what
shouldn't.
This response shows, I think, a woeful lack of understanding of
current historical methods. Scholarly consensus worldwide is achieved, as far as I
can tell, by the emergence of an informal but nevertheless widespread
opinion which dismisses patently bad history more or less out of hand. This
process can take many decades.
Good history is accepted when it has been discussed, modified, quoted and used as
reference material. Some history turns out to be so good and to meet so
many of the tough standards of scholarly debate that it becomes
essential reading for student historians and others.
Perhaps aware that this process can take a long time (in some special
cases
centuries), the Seminar, after detailed discussion of material,
has achieved a limited consensus very quickly. It has done so by using a weighted average to assess the degree of consensus
among its members at a point in time.
This can be caricatured as "voting." Or it can be recognised as a
device which understands that, in line with history's built-in
provisionality, historians increasingly state their conclusions in a
statistical manner.
On matters for which the data are extremely strong,
the modern historian will say, for example, that an interpretation or
explanation is "almost certainly" the case. Instead,
therefore, of bluntly stating that the resurrection didn't happen, the
modern historian is more likely to maintain that if the resurrection
"really happened" it must have been an unimaginably rare
historical event.
None of this renders the Seminar's findings absolute or final
- though it seems to its critics that the weighted scores and subsequent
ratings are claiming both. I doubt very much that the Seminar's
conclusions are understood by its members as anything but provisional.
Those who mock its findings apparently have no understanding of what was attempted and what has been achieved.
The provisionality of the historical method has proved unpalatable
not only for traditionally-minded Christians, but also for some secular
minds.
The latter have turned to what is called
"historicism" - an attempt to use history to explain more about
the world than it is able. They have searched for laws of historical process.
Such laws would allow clear and certain conclusions about the past on one hand, and
predictions about the future on the other.
That is, they have
tried to sever any links between individual choice and events
unfolding on the larger canvas of social history. Their direction is
strongly deterministic.
Chief among these attempts was the "historical
materialism" proposed by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels
(usually called "materialism" because it contrasted with the
"supernaturalism" of Christianity). Not only has Marxism proved
untenable as an historical hypothesis, but it appears to have been
overtaken by events of the late 20th century.
However, its failure lies at a deeper level. Marx and
Engels did not comprehend the almost infinite complexity of the systems of
cause and effect which comprise what we somewhat blithely term "history." The
complexity is so great that no historian can claim any more than a surface
knowledge or understanding of its details. On the larger scale,
observations are always highly abstract, and depend for their validity and
usefulness on an often problematic step down into the details which back
up the broader conclusions.
The most an historian can claim is to understand an
event as a "guiding thread" for the future, something which
might provide a sufficient condition for an event to occur. It's
significant that Marx and Engels evolved their socio-economic theories at
roughly the same time as physicists were proclaiming that Newton's laws
were definitive for all of reality. Marx and Engels appear to have hoped
that their analysis of history and society would have the same
characteristic.
Newton's laws have been shown to apply only in limited
conditions. All laws, including Newton's laws of motion and
thermodynamics, have exceptions. To put this another way with regard to
history, all so-called historical laws will be shown to be wrong if
contradicted by even a single historical event. Marx, Engels and their
disciples imposed on historical processes a degree of order and certainty
they can never possess. Significantly, this absolutist political dogma
closely resembles absolutist Christian dogmas. Both have brought great
misery to humanity.
Yet again, if laws of history
do exist then there is a class of historical events which are not unique but
repetitive. The existence of a law of history implies that an event will
always occur when certain conditions exist. What we now know is that
no event is ever repeated. In deed, there is no such thing as an
historical "event". We only separate "events" out from
the seamless flow of history for our own convenience. An event is merely
an abstract device we use so that we can talk about the past. No
"event" has objective reality.
If this is not recognised, the history becomes a search
for a complete system of laws rather than the study of what really
happened. Discover all the laws, it is supposed, and the future becomes completely
predictable. History as we know it then becomes redundant - at least in theory.
If there are no laws in history, but only rough and
uncertain guidelines, is it possible that some events are in a class of
their own?
One of the strongest historical
arguments for the resurrection of Jesus after death is that it is a unique
"event" in history. It can be argued that even though our evidence for the
resurrection appearances isn't the best, it's sufficient to persuade a
reasonable person that this event could have happened if it was of a kind
that happens only once.
Uniqueness, it might be said, is an essential characteristic
of history. It appears that time flows in only one direction, just as
water always flows downwards. This conclusion is in turn derived from,
amongst other things, Einstein's discovery that time and space are
inseparably linked in a space/time continuum. When you and I say,
"I am here" we are also saying something about a particular
time. And when we say, "It is now," we are maintaining that
we're at a particular point in three-dimensional space.
As far as we can now tell (all knowledge being
provisional) if two identical events exist, they cannot either occupy the
same space at the same time, nor occur at the same time in the same space.
Two otherwise identical events must therefore mean something
different in the seamless web of history because their contexts are
different.
In this sense it is possible that there has only ever
been one resurrection from death. There may have been only one human being
who, like Jesus of Nazareth, could be described as belonging to both the
natural and the supernatural realms. The debate about the usefulness of
the historical method for Christianity might cease here - if it were not
for one important, if not critical, consideration.
Historians are experts in a single field of knowledge.
That field, however, can be classed as "field encompassing." It
can and does use any datum from any other field of knowledge to help gain greater certainty. All
historical conclusions are provisional because, according to contemporary
thought, they state not absolutes but degrees of probability. The greater the range of data
which support an historical conclusion, the more likely it is to be true
(that is, highly probable).
However, history can only be field-encompassing if the
nature of Truth (with a big "T") is the same across all fields. For evidence from
chemistry, physics, medicine, archeology, biology, astronomy, linguistics
to be validly used in historical research, what applies to one must apply
to all. In saying this I accept that Truth is, and has always been, a
human invention. This implies that Truth today will not be the same
tomorrow (but the implications of this are too wide to be dealt with
here).
Let's assume now that the resurrection of Jesus is a stand-alone event
in all of history, past and to come. If all the findings of all modern
disciplines indicate that such a thing is impossible, only the brave or
foolhardy historian will assert it as something "which really
happened, but only once."
Further, it is argued by many historians that what applies now (if only provisionally) must
always have applied. Physics as we know it today, for example, would have
yielded the same kind and degrees of truth if it had been possible in the
1st century. Atoms, for example didn't come into existence only when we
discovered them.
Similarly, modern doctors, if they had been members of Alexander the
Great's entourage, would have been able to inoculate him against the virus which
many historians (but not all) suspect killed him in 323 bce. As
it turned out, inoculation came some 2 300 years too late for the
unfortunate adventurer.
A result of this line of thought is that historical proof that something
which happened only once would have to be cast-iron. No reputable historian is
likely to demand anything less for an event as out-of-the-ordinary as
resurrection from death. Historical evidence for the supposedly unique
resurrection of Jesus from death does not remotely match this extremely demanding,
but essential, degree of certainty.
In short, unless there is an equivalence of
understanding across
all knowledge today and all knowledge over the whole of time, history as
we know it is impossible. Just because historical methodology was crude
two thousand years ago doesn't mean that what we today use is wrong. Nor
will our history be invalidated in the future if historical methods
improve greatly. Some conclusions will fail, perhaps, and some methods
will be seen as inadequate. Unless this equivalence exists, nobody can say that event A
operated according to the same processes as event B.
Human death, for example, is now what it has
always been. If the principle of equivalence is wrong, and death is one
thing for Jesus and entirely another for Napoleon, the word "death" doesn't
have a single meaning. We are forced to say that Jesus died one kind
of "death" and Napoleon another.
So if I say that death is the irreversible cessation
of cellular activity in the human body, I must change that definition for
the death of Jesus. If I do that, who is to say that Napoleon died the
same kind of death that his adversary Wellington died? Even if there is only a
single exception to the nature of death, the historian must allow the
possibility of infinite variability in kinds of "death".
In such a situation, what can be
said about history as a seamless web of interlocking events? Every
historian is free to make his or her own idiosyncratic version of history,
without check or correction by others.
One final possibility remains. It is that the background
assumption of our forefathers that the supernatural (God) can, as it were,
invade and impact the natural world in fact applies. This appears to be an invincible
position to hold - and it is indeed held by many. How is anyone ever to
demonstrate that a supernatural dimension or world doesn't exist?
But I think it's difficult to hold this position and
put any trust in modern history. History as we know it explores and
interprets a seamless web of events. Even to talk of an "event"
is strictly speaking to distort reality since the flow of what we call "cause and
effect" is without break. The isolation of an "event" is
artificial, made so that we can talk about a more general flow of
"events."
Let's suppose that God, operating from the supernatural
into the natural, invaded or otherwise decisively influenced the United
States' President Truman when he finally sanctioned the dropping of the
first atom bomb on Hiroshima in 1945. If this is what really happened,
then the seamless web of normal history was broken at that point.
Something happened which was not caused by events preceding it.
In a very real sense, therefore, the entire course of
history as a seamless web would have begun anew at that point. The only
reason for studying the history came before God's intervention in 1945 would be
to know how it ended before the point of intervention.
If one multiplies
God's interventions to any great degree, it seems to me that history
becomes essentially the art of detecting when the supernatural has
impacted the natural. If
God is totally in charge, if every event derives from outside nature, then
cause and effect as we normally suppose them to operate in history, disappear.
God becomes the only direct cause of everything from microsecond to
microsecond.
How I am able to tell whether anything I
encounter is supernatural then becomes an absolutely critical question. What are the criteria for differentiating
between supernatural and natural events? If I'm to know anything about
history I must be able to detect when God has intervened and when not.
Those who assert a supernatural key to the historical
process, who tell us that God intervenes in the systems of the universe,
must know the answers to this problem. If they don't know, I question their conclusion that a
supernatural dimension exists. Is their statement that God is in charge of
nature and therefore of history founded upon observation? Or do they rely
on authority? Or perhaps they know it through that communication direct from
the supernatural which is usually called revelation?
Historians must be
told the answers to these questions, or they cannot distinguish natural events
from supernatural ones. Nor, if they cannot differentiate between the two,
can they write history of any sort.
To sum up:
- Christianity is an historical faith, derived from the life of a real
man who actually existed in history just as we all do.
- History is the study of "what really happened."
- The Bible as the infallible revelation of God direct to humankind
was once the definitive source of historical truth.
- Modern knowledge is characterised by a break from revealed truth
accepted on the say-so of authority.
- The fundamental characteristics of modern history are shared by all
branches of contemporary knowledge.
- Two defences against historical truth are the "faith is
all" and the "head in the sand" movements.
- Historicism attempts to use history for purposes to which it is not
suited. One example is the historical materialism of Marx and Engels.
- It is possible that the life, death and resurrection of Jesus are a
unique series of historical events. Even the most rigorous historical
method must allow this possibility - but the cost is high.
- Another possibility is that some historical events in
time and space result from interventions out of a supernatural
dimension. But if so, difficult questions remain to be answered.
- The principle of historical equivalence (analogy) requires that
truth is the same all through history. If this is so, even unique
events which contradict the entire body of modern knowledge are
suspect.
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