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A PLAIN GUIDE TO
...
Life
(Continued)
Yet another perspective is given by considering the significance of
life in the vastness of the universe. As far as we know (noting that we
may not be able to either perceive or recognise higher types of life)
humans and so-called "lower" forms of life on the planet Earth
are the only life in the universe. It seems, however, that statistically
speaking the existence of other sentient beings in the universe is almost
certain, given the incalculably huge number of galaxies and solar systems
which have recently been observed.
This is not to say, however, that all such life will exist
simultaneously (from a hypothetical observer's point of view, one external to the universe). We exist "now" and other sentient
life exists "now" in another part of the universe. But, as
Einstein demonstrated, any information about the others will only reach us
when they are far in our "past" because that information can't
travel faster than the speed of light, and they may be separated from us
by billions of light years. In other words, each instance of life may
be isolated from all other instances in a vast space/time continuum.
Even if life is common in the universe, it must by its very nature be
insignificant in the bigger scheme of universal events unless (as many
say) whatever meaning life acquires is derived from an
"encounter" between God and humanity. In this scheme of things,
life is to be seen as a "gift", rather than as the outcome
(designed or not, as the case may be) of a series of events in the
universe which eventually - and then only after a vast stretch of time,
some 13 000 000 000 years - gave rise to the negatively-entropic systems
we call "life".
I think that the pessimistic view rests on an inconsistency which may
not always be immediately apparent. That inconsistency is the inference that something
which ends has no value while it exists. Why should life mean nothing just because it will one day end? The connection is not
obvious. In addition, the pessimist position depends on the possibility of
verifying that death is the end of life. We know we live, and we know what
life is like. But we can't, by definition, know that death ends life. We
can't therefore compare life with no-life except in terms of the physical.
Similarly, if life is but a tiny spark in the vast reaches of the
space/time continuum, why should it therefore have little meaning or
value? To say that is like saying that a very rare diamond is worth less
because it's rare. Precisely the opposite may be the case. Further, to be
precise, we don't know if the universe will end nor, if it does, when this
will happen. How relevant - except in a theoretical sense - is such a
distant future to anyone?
The arguments around the value of life are many and complex. As I
review them, however, I conclude that they all resolve into a single
primary question:
If life has value, is that value intrinsic or is it extrinsic?
Life is intrinsically valuable
This is the response of traditional Christianity and other theist
religions. God's creation is
valuable because a good God created everything.
So God made them all, and he was pleased with all he saw (Genesis
1.25).
Intrinsic value isn't something which can be argued. It is
self-evident. So, for example, if one accepts that God reveals truth to us
by various means, it's presumably possible to accept that life has
meaning and value because we have access to that as a revealed truth.
I take this to be the position, for example, of those who think that
Jesus was in some sense God. If that is the case, when Jesus says that
love of self and neighbour is the most important of all values, he
establishes the intrinsic meaning and value of humanity. If intrinsic
value is established, it should be noted, choice of value becomes
redundant. Such value is absolute for all people at all times.
Life is extrinsically valuable
I should more properly state this as Life is extrinsically valued
because it implies that value is established by an evaluator - be the
evaluator an individual or a group.
Extrinsic value is assessed in terms of the past, the present and the
future. When I go on a Sunday picnic, I might ask myself on Monday,
"Was the picnic worth the trouble?" I might be at party and ask
myself, "Am I enjoying this?" Or I might look forward to a
holiday in France as against a holiday in South Africa and ask,
"Which one will I enjoy most?"
From this point of view, I can fully understand that a cat will not
value a haystack except for the mice in it, while a cow will value the
haystack as a tasty snack and the mice as something to be discarded. A man
might value a woman and a woman a man - for obvious reasons. But that
doesn't preclude a man valuing a man and a woman a woman for similar reasons.
To sum up, it is possible to state that life is valuable because some
authority, who for some reason can't be refuted, has established the value.
This is usually the position of those who claim access to revelation
direct from God.
Or it can be argued from first principles that life has intrinsic
value, or not as the case may be. I haven't yet come across a truly
convincing version of either argument.
It can be argued that life's value "is in the eye of the
beholder" - the so-called relative or post-modern position. This
isn't all that popular a position, if only because it implies that value
is a matter of choice, both individual and social.
There remains, however, what I suppose might be called a hybrid
position. It might go something like this:
- Value is indeed a matter of individual and social choice.
- But that doesn't mean that there is no such thing as a correct or
"best" choice about the value of life.
- The universe comprises myriads of sub-systems. That's how it works.
No sub-system stands alone in the total system. All are entirely interdependent - although
not every system is essential to the existence of the universe as an
all-embracing system.
- The nature of systems is that they always tend towards greater
complexity (degrees of self-organisation). Humanity is the most complex sub-system we know of (and,
perhaps, can know of). If in humanity the universe has, as it were,
produced the most complex system in a total system which tends towards
complexity, then the negatively entropic system must have more value than
entropic, less complex, systems.
This appears reasonable at first sight. But I should point out that its
efficacy depends on two subsidiary choices:
- That greater complexity is more valuable than less complexity; and
- that the universe itself has value.
Neither I nor you can "prove" either that God exists or
doesn't exist. If that's possible, nobody I know of has yet done it. In
other words the intrinsic value of the universe can be posited only if one
chooses a hypothetically existent God, since such a primary being would
(according to human lights anyway) hardly lack a reason for creating the
universe. This choice establishes intrinsic value for everything.
Similarly, it's possible to give the universe (as the master-system) an
extrinsic value. All one has to do is to choose to value the universe for
what it is, or some particular aspect of the universe (such as sentience,
or complexity, or the capacity to reflect on itself in and through
humanity) for what it is.
In short, it seems impossible to say that "Life has value" in the same
way that one can say, "The earth's atmosphere contains oxygen."
But one can say, "I value life above everything else"; or one
can say, "I value life because God created it." These two latter positions are not, it seems to me, much
different since they both rest ultimately upon an individual's choice. In
the final analysis, therefore, the value of life is extrinsic.
Paul Edwards puts it this way: The conclusion that life either is or
isn't valuable can't be refuted because
... the question whether a universe with human life is better than
one without it does not have any clear meaning unless it is interpreted
as a request for a statement of personal preference [4].
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[1] Asimov's New Guide to Science, Isaac Asimov, 1987
[2] See Erwin Lazslo: Introduction to Systems Philosophy, 1972 and The
Systems View of the World, 1972; General System Theory, Ludwig
von Bertalanffy, 1968
[3] Quoted by Paul Edwards in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
Volume 4, 1967
[4] Life, Meaning and Value of in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy
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